men, and despite a radical anthropological approach that considered many alternative social arrangements, she concluded that monogamous marriages, preferably achieved early in life, were most beneficial for society. She was also a strong advocate for equality of the sexes, albeit acknowledging certain fixed differences between men and women in terms of skills and temperament. Society, she suggested, would be much improved by allowing women to freely partake of activities that were currently only open to men.

Like many contemporaries, Clapperton recognized that early marriages often led to an extended period of reproduction, resulting in many unsupported children. Since this created further social ills, Clapperton endorsed the use of contraceptives. Despite her view of sexual relations as healthy, she was careful to note that reproductive sex ought to be carefully considered and monitored by society at large, and that only sufficiently robust individuals ought to reproduce. Many of her ideas were related to her role in the Malthusian League established in 1877 and reflected the influence of eugenics upon some areas of socialist thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Her ideas were taken up again by American eugenicists in the 1930s.

Although Clapperton's critique of utilitarian ethics has not had a significant or lasting impact on moral philosophy, her writings on gender and sexuality have, in recent years, attracted the notice of scholars who regard Clapperton as one of the "New Women," and an important figure in the transitional generation preceding the emergence of the more radical feminist thinkers of the early twentieth century.

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See also FABIAN SOCIALISM; FEMINISM; SPENCER, HERBERT.

COLLECTIVE UTILITARIANISM

Collective Utilitarianism refers to an important family of utilitarian views, each of which makes use of the idea of *what a group could do*. To see what is distinctive about such views, consider the following example. Suppose that, if no one took more than one return air trip per year, there would be a significant reduction in the harm caused by climate change; yet, any single trip makes a tiny difference. An act utilitarian focuses on the difference each individual action could make, so he or she might conclude that the effects on climate change provide very little reason not to fly. A proponent of Collective Utilitarianism focuses on the difference the actions of some group could make. Thus, such a proponent might conclude that the effects on climate change provide each individual traveller with a powerful reason not to fly.

We must be careful about such cases. There are ways by which act utilitarians could seek to explain the convictions that appear to favour Collective Utilitarian theories (Parfit, Ch. 3; Otsuka, 1991; Kagan, 2011). But the example illustrates some of the appeal of Collective Utilitarianism.

A crucial issue for Collective Utilitarians is how to determine membership of the relevant group. According to "cooperative utilitarianism" (one form of Collective Utilitarianism), membership depends on who is cooperative. As Regan shows, cooperative utilitarianism

has important advantages over act utilitarianism when others are cooperative, since it can solve some coordination problems that appear insoluble for act utilitarianism (Regan, Ch.8). When others are uncooperative, however, the implications of cooperative utilitarianism coincide with those of act utilitarianism.

By contrast, according to some other Collective Utilitarian theories—such as compliance-based forms of rule utilitarianism—membership of the group does *not* depend on cooperativeness. Rule utilitarians treat all or almost all agents, even uncooperative ones, as members of the group. These views have markedly different implications than act utilitarianism and a quite different sort of appeal than cooperative utilitarianism. They might be used to explain convictions about the demandingness of morality (Mulgan, Ch.10; Murphy, Ch.5), for example, or "deontological" convictions that one should not perform certain actions even when doing so has the best consequences (Hooker, Ch.6; Woodard, Ch.2). On the other hand, these theories are open to criticism for the very reason that, unlike cooperative utilitarianism or act utilitarianism, they countenance failure to maximize the good in some cases.

The family of possible Collective Utilitarian theories is very diverse. As well as the views already mentioned, there could be theories according to which the relevant group extends further than the class of cooperative agents but not as far as all, or almost all, agents. Intrapersonal analog of Collective Utilitarianism are also possible, in which the "members" are different parts of the same individual (Hurley, Ch.8). One might even think of act utilitarianism as a limiting case of Collective Utilitarianism, in which the only member is the agent's present self. Forms of Collective Utilitarianism that focus on different subject matter (e.g. reasons or virtue rather than rightness) could also be developed.

Some critics worry that Collective Utilitarian theories must be based on a form of magical thinking, in which the agent believes that her choice will cause others to behave as necessary to produce the good outcome. This betrays a misunderstanding. Collective Utilitarians insist that rightness (or some other subject matter) depends not on what others in the group *will* do, but on what they *could* do. Their thought is not that the agent's choice will cause others to behave in a way that would have good effects, but instead that those others could behave in that way, and that this, not their actual response, is the morally relevant fact.

Defenders of Collective Utilitarianism face significant challenges. However, the terrain is rich and not yet fully explored, and there are grounds for hope that some form of Collective Utilitarianism will yield a satisfying normative theory.

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See also ACT UTILITARIANISM; RULE UTILITARIANISM.